Dr Mike Forsythe, Lead for Head Injury & Concussion Service
Why this matters now
The evidence that professional football carries a raised risk of neurodegenerative disease is strong. The evidence on exactly what causes it, and what limit on heading would make the game safe, is much weaker. Any debate about legal limits has to keep both facts in view.
This week Grahame Morris, Labour MP for Easington, tabled an Early Day Motion calling for legal limits on repetitive heading in training, supporting a petition from the charity Head Safe Football. It also asks for a cross-government task force, recognition of chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE) as a public health concern, a national action plan and better education, including in schools.
This article looks at what the science supports, and where it remains uncertain.
What the large studies show
Two large population studies found that former professional footballers are more likely to develop neurodegenerative disease than comparable non-players. Both studies are observational. They show an association; on their own they cannot prove that football, or heading in particular, causes the disease.
| Study | Who was studied | Main finding | Notable detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| FIELD, Scotland (Mackay et al., NEJM, 2019) | 7,676 male ex-professionals born 1900–1976 vs 23,028 matched controls | Neurodegenerative disease recorded as a cause of death 3.45 times as often (1.7% vs 0.5%) | Ex-players were less likely to die of heart disease and lung cancer |
| Swedish elite football (Ueda et al., Lancet Public Health, 2023) | 6,007 male top-division players (1924–2019) vs 56,168 controls | Neurodegenerative disease diagnosed 1.46 times as often (about 9% vs 6%) | Goalkeepers showed no raised risk |
Reading the headline number carefully
The 3.45 figure is real, but four pieces of context are worth bearing in mind.
- Relative versus absolute risk. In FIELD, neurodegenerative disease was a cause of death for about 1.7 in 100 former players, against 0.5 in 100 controls. That is a large relative increase in a fairly uncommon outcome. It is serious, but “three and a half times” on its own can make the risk sound larger than it is. Importantly, these figures recorded causes of death during follow-up, not the lifetime risk of developing dementia.
- The players studied were from an earlier era. FIELD’s players were born between 1900 and 1976. Balls, pitches, training methods and the style of play have all changed. We cannot assume today’s players face the same risk, whether higher or lower.
- Position matters. A follow-up FIELD analysis (Russell et al., JAMA Neurology, 2021) found goalkeepers’ risk was not significantly raised. Defenders had roughly five times the risk of controls. Goalkeepers rarely head the ball, so this pattern fits heading being part of the explanation.
- Career length matters. In the same analysis, risk rose with the length of a playing career, to around five times for careers longer than 15 years. A dose-response pattern like this is one of the classic signs that an exposure may be causal. However, longer careers also mean potentially greater exposure to collisions, concussions and other factors, not just heading.
All of these findings come from male professionals. They tell us little about women, children or recreational players.
CTE: what is known and what is disputed
Chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE) can currently be confirmed only by examining the brain after death. It is defined by a specific pattern of the protein tau, collected around small blood vessels deep in the folds of the brain’s surface. These criteria were agreed by a US National Institutes of Health panel in 2016 and refined in 2021.
There is no validated test for CTE in living people. In 2021, researchers proposed criteria for “traumatic encephalopathy syndrome”, the clinical picture that may go with it. But this cannot yet confirm CTE in an individual.
Importantly, identifying CTE pathology after death does not necessarily mean that it caused the person’s symptoms during life. The relationship between CTE pathology, dementia and other neurological or psychiatric symptoms remains incompletely understood.
On causation, expert bodies differ:
- In 2022 the US National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke stated that CTE is caused in part by repeated traumatic brain injuries. A group of researchers reached a stronger conclusion about repetitive head impacts more broadly by applying the Bradford Hill criteria, a standard framework for judging causation (Nowinski et al., Frontiers in Neurology, 2022).
- The international Concussion in Sport Group consensus (Amsterdam 2022, published 2023) was more cautious. It concluded that a causal link between repetitive head impacts and CTE had not been firmly established.
Much of the CTE evidence comes from brain banks. These mostly receive brains from people whose families already suspected a problem, which can overstate how common the disease is. The size of the risk to the average player is therefore unknown, even among those who accept the link.
Is heading the cause, or part of it?
Heading is a plausible and potentially important contributor, but the evidence that it is the main cause is circumstantial. Nobody has directly measured lifetime heading in a group of players and followed them through to dementia.
What points towards heading:
- The goalkeeper comparison. Goalkeepers play the same sport and share the same lifestyle, but rarely head the ball. In both FIELD and the Swedish study, they did not show a clearly raised risk.
- Short-term laboratory effects. At the University of Stirling, 19 participants performed 20 headers from a ball machine and researchers detected measurable changes in brain signalling and short-term memory. These had largely returned to normal within 24 hours (Di Virgilio et al., EBioMedicine, 2016). Whether repeated short-term changes add up to long-term damage is not known.
- Imaging studies. A study of 37 adult amateur players found that those reporting high numbers of headers per year (above roughly 900 to 1,500) had differences in measures of white-matter microstructure on diffusion MRI (Lipton et al., Radiology, 2013). It was small and cross-sectional, so it cannot show which came first. These findings do not establish brain injury or a threshold above which heading becomes unsafe.
What complicates the picture:
- Outfield players also suffer head-to-head, head-to-elbow and head-to-ground impacts, and concussions. Defenders are potentially exposed to more of these as well as more headers. Studies so far cannot cleanly separate heading from these other blows.
- Genetics and other factors are likely to affect who becomes ill, but how they interact with head impacts is not yet understood.
- Regulation ball weight has barely changed for decades. But older leather balls absorbed water and got heavier in wet conditions, while changes in ball construction, aerodynamics and playing styles may have altered the nature of heading impacts. Nobody knows whether the risk per header today is higher or lower than it was.
What we don’t know yet
The central policy question is how many headers are safe. There are currently gaps in our knowledge:
- No safe threshold has been identified. The FA’s limit of 10 higher-force headers a week in profession training is a precautionary figure, not one derived from data linking a number of headers to disease. Different restrictions already apply to grassroots and youth football, including the prohibition of deliberate heading in U7–U11 matches and training.
- No direct evidence yet that limits prevent long-term disease. Training limits are recent, and dementia develops over decades. Restrictions can reduce heading exposure, but whether this translates into fewer cases of neurodegenerative disease remains unknown and will take many years to become clear.
- Women’s football. The major studies were of men. There is some evidence that women may be more vulnerable to concussion, but data on long-term heading risk in women is very limited.
- Recreational and youth players. We know little about risk at the much lower exposure levels of amateur or children’s football.
- Heading versus other impacts. How much of the excess risk is due to heading rather than collisions and concussions is unresolved.
- Today’s game. Whether players in the modern game carry the same risk as those born between 1900 and 1976 is unknown.
The FA states that the link “remains the subject of ongoing scientific and medical research” but some believe this is being used to downplay the fact that an association in professionals is now well established.
An important distinction is that the absence of an identified safe threshold does not mean every header carries an equal or measurable risk. Equally, the absence of evidence that heading restrictions prevent dementia does not mean those restrictions are ineffective. We simply do not yet know how changes in heading exposure translate into long-term neurological outcomes.
The case for legal limits
Supporters argue that waiting for certainty means waiting decades while players keep being exposed.
- The precautionary argument. The association in professionals is consistent across countries. Its pattern by position and career length fits heading. Cutting repetitive heading drills costs relatively little compared with the harm if the link proves causal.
- Guidance isn’t reaching people. Supporters of legal limits argue that awareness and implementation of existing guidance are inconsistent. Even well-designed restrictions offer limited protection if coaches, clubs and parents are unaware of them or do not follow them.
- Professional football is a workplace. Professional players are employees. UK law already sets limits on other workplace exposures with long-term health effects, such as noise and vibration, without waiting for perfect data on a safe dose.
- Inconsistency between nations. Scotland already restricts heading in professional training the day before and after matches, which England does not. These are football governing-body measures rather than statutory restrictions. A statutory baseline would end that patchwork.
The case for caution
Sceptics of legislation mostly accept the risk, but question whether a legal limit is the right tool.
- No evidence-based number to write into law. Any statutory limit would rest on a precautionary figure. If later research points elsewhere, law is slower to change than guidance.
- Enforcement. Counting headers in thousands of amateur and youth training sessions is hard to imagine in practice. A law that cannot be enforced may give false reassurance.
- Other sources of head impact. If collisions and concussion account for part of the risk, a heading-only law addresses only part of the problem. Concussion management, return-to-play rules and match laws matter too.
- Football’s health benefits. Former players in FIELD were less likely to die from heart disease and lung cancer. If fears about heading put people off playing at recreational level, where the risk is least understood, the overall public health effect could be negative. This trade-off has not been measured.
- Where the money goes. Some argue that for former players already affected, care funding, compensation and research may be more beneficial than new training laws.
- Heading technique. Some have argued that by preventing heading practice at a young age, players won’t have the opportunity to learn proper technique, potentially affecting their ability to head the ball safely when heading is introduced later. However, there is currently little evidence that restricting heading practice in childhood increases injury risk subsequently.
Where this leaves us
The science supports taking the risk seriously, but it doesn’t yet show where to draw the line. Former professional footballers have a clearly higher rate of neurodegenerative disease. Heading is a plausible and potentially important contributor, but not proven to be the only one, and no safe number of headers has been identified.
What the evidence does support is:
- making sure existing guidance actually reaches coaches, parents and schools and is understood and followed
- recording heading and other head-impact exposure, so future studies can answer the dose question
- funding research that includes women, youth and recreational players
- supporting the former players and families living with the consequences
Where the science is uncertain, the honest position is to acknowledge this, and focus our efforts on filling in the gaps in our understanding.
That uncertainty should not prevent sensible precautions. Equally, precautionary restrictions should not be presented as though they have already been proven to prevent dementia. The challenge is to make proportionate decisions based on the evidence we have, while continuing to develop the evidence we need.